TEL D MOTOR OF MELE

The Sccretary

Kill allay's results to " a wine on at a Kraslin recorded to appest the he foresees a parapeted puriod of pulling an acting be. g set out of the Cuban crisic. His remarks have all the genome Nov. I also may, as on occasion in the past, be involved only sig .....lon.

Commission on a King of white while Cuban lactors did not believe to area antis product to have de Cuba, he did, and further that he had . ur will Ollians that if the President did not keep his word it would mean wer. Thus, Wirman way gives the Lypession of believing that it a now wile for him to offer the Cube of a limit but which Moseow has -- I loust in public -- avoided riving Her mon Reduced. While putting of a show of buoyant partering idea I will benefit of the foreign of a, in the evening that has "forty will ture "purbably" -- he up: the transfer in this connection on rouse home. He said the world is not jur at the felip or the precipice of nuclear war"-- an unusually Bullosian formulation for the miet Delmier though the general Chema of hower as to war alls world sould have been to not for Soviet Corollaborates has been a discourse of recent Soviet princurcements.



. .

In No Longer Readle. Evidently ware that the US would not be librally to agree to a summit meeting as long as the Cuban situation remains unresolved, Khrushelev new profess, to see as argent no are one. For the present, he that it solves himself from even the tentauty commitment to a meeting ingles in his Catabas 24 letter to Largeond Russell. Hevertheless, Khrushe as iterationed to hold for an the product of an agreement on a nuclear state on a result of "oute-a-tate bakes with the US.

But, as was true of earlier indications as opvinism about a test bon, he gaves no indication that the S ries Union may be prepared to accept an

Soviet Class. While announcing that the present haviet period will end at Movember 20 (the previously impounced that are the unl of management, i.e. testing, at Noveya Zénigal), he states and who USSR will continue preparing further tests, and would carry them out in the absence of agreement. He case scans to rule out a unilateral basist agreement.

obligation to permit in-site imagachion.

Builded in Absympton. Mirushchev refrains from saying anything of substance about Berlin. He does state that the problem "is assuming greater acuteness," -- the first time such a note of urgency has been included since the Colon prisis -- how gives no indication of what writen he might take and pointedly avoids setting any deadline for each a start or finish of negotiotisms on the subject.

## DEPARTMENT OF STATE THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

To : The Secretary

THROUGH : S/S

FROM : INR - Thomas L. Hughes

INTELLIGENCE NOTE: KHRUSHCHEV PREPARES FOR LONG END GAME IN CUBAN CRISIS

Khrushchev remarks to Western newsmen at a Kremlin reception today suggest that he foresees a protracted period of pulling and hauling before any settlement of the Cuban crisis. His remarks have not been reported by Soviet media and may, as on occasion in the past, be intended only for foreign consumption.

Confidence in Non-Invasion Guarantee. Khrushchev stated that while Cuban leaders did not believe the President's promise not to invade Cuba, he did, and further that he had assured the Cubans that if the President did not keep his word it would mean war. Thus, Khrushchev gives the impression of believing that it is now safe for him to offer the Cubans a commitment which Moscow has -- at least in public -- avoided giving.

Tension Reduced. While putting on a show of buoyant self-confidence for the benefit of the foreign press. Khrushchev said that his "forty" missiles are "probably" -- he uses the vague word in this connection -- en route home. He said the world is no longer at the "edge of the precipice of nuclear war" -- an unusually Dullesian formulation for the Soviet Premier, though the general theme of how close to war the world would have been if not for Soviet follower nce has been a feature of recent Soviet pronouncements.

CONFIDENTIAL

Summit No Longer Needed. Evidently aware that the US would not be likely to agree to a summit meeting as long as the Cuban situation remains unresolved, Khrushchev now professes to see no urgent need for one. For the present, he thus absolves himself from even the tentative commitment to a meeting implied in his October 24 letter to Bertrand Russell. Nevertheless, Khrushchev continues to hold open the prospect of an agreement on a nuclear test ban as a result of "tete-a-tete" talks with the US. But, as was true of earlier indications of optimism about a test ban, he gives no indication that the Soviet Union may be prepared to accept an obligation to permit on-site inspection.

Soviet Tests. While announcing that the present Soviet series will end on November 20 (the previously announced date for the end of maneuvers, i.e. testing, at Novaya Zemlya), he states that the USSR will continue preparing further tests, and would carry them out in the absence of agreement. He thus seems to rule our a unilateral Soviet moratorium gambit.

Berlin in Abeyance. Khrushchev refrains from saying anything of substance about Berlin. He does state that the problem "is assuming greater acuteress," - the first time such a note of urgency has been introduced since the Cuban crisis -- but gives of indication of what action he might take and pointedly avoids setting any deadline for either the start or finish of negotiations on the subject.